By Gunnar Wainwright

On January 27, Gen. Michael Minihan, the Commander of the Air Force's Air Mobility Command, sent a memo to officers under his command warning that the United States will be at war with China by 2025 and that airmen should prepare to fight. 

The memo from the general presents a unique challenge to the Biden Administration’s, or civilian leadership’s, power to define its national security strategy because it publically undermines the Biden Administration’s framing of the challenge China presents to the US and Taiwan. In a time of ballooning tensions, the Biden Administration will need to navigate executing a National Security Strategy that frames China as a “pacing challenge” alongside an institution, bolstered by the public’s respect for it, that has personnel willing to break norms to disagree.

The slow degradation of civilian control of the military in the United States is well documented. Risa Brooks, Jim Golby and Heidi Urban highlight several trends contributing to what some see as the break-down in this constitutionally-defined relationship, including the recent nominations of retired generals to the Secretary of Defense role and the increasing comfort retired personnel find in publicly participating in partisan politics. Brooks, Golby and Urban attribute these examples partially to the military being one of the last remaining public institutions that maintain public support and trust. This public veneration for military expertise puts political pressure on civilian leadership, from the President to Congress, to, at best, avoid the perception of a confrontation with military leadership on national security strategy, despite those powers being explicitly assigned to civilians. 

Minihan’s memo publicly contradicts the Biden administration’s assertion that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not imminent. Colin Kahl, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, clarified the confusion by confirming that the department does not see an invasion as imminent, reiterating the National Security Strategy’s classification of China as a “pacing challenge.” 

Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund, concurs, tweeting that an invasion of Taiwan is “not inevitable or likely,” and adding that “Xi prefers not to use force.” While Xi’s recent rhetoric about reunification deserves consideration, his emphasis on “peaceful national reunification” does not signal a sudden shift in China’s stance. The distance between the administration’s “pacing challenge” framework and Minihan’s position striking. 

It's not difficult to perceive this memo as an effort to fortify opposition to the Biden administration's portrayal of China, capitalizing on public trust in the military. Throughout history, military leadership has not hesitated to leverage its support and trust to undermine civilian oversight. Julian Zelizer's "Arsenal of Democracy" recounts that during the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur, then Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Japan, openly criticized Truman for failing to prevent the communist revolution in China.

MacArthur escalated his public dissent against Truman while commanding the United Nations Command. Although he was ultimately relieved due to insubordination, MacArthur influenced the Republican consensus, and arguably public sentiment, toward a more conservative stance on containment. This involved accepting higher costs and even pursuing regime change in North Korea to contain communism on the Korean Peninsula, achieved through his public disagreements with Truman.

While Minihan’s command is comparatively small and the consequences of his position are less significant than MacArthur’s, there is a parallel in how the two men leveraged public opinion, institutional reverence, and a receptive Congressional audience to advance their positions at the expense of civilian leadership.

In the present day, Republicans control the House of Representatives, elected by voters who overwhelmingly view China as the United States’ top foreign policy threat. Recognizing the consensus of their electorate, many Republicans may have simply been waiting for a military source, carrying both public trust and institutional support, to shield their challenge to the administration's stance from partisan labeling. GOP congressmen have already publicly agreed with the general’s gut. 

It is not just elected officials who are coalescing around this position. The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board agreed with the general. Tucker Carlson dedicates a significant air time to carrying the General’s position, from calling Democrats “weak” to chastising the military as so "woke" it would lose to China. By amplifying and endorsing Minihan's prediction of imminent war, conservative media insulates their criticisms of the administration's China policy, and the administration itself, by relying on the military’s public trust. 

When a worst-case analysis is elevated by media figures Republican voters trust, we risk that position becoming impossible for Republican politicians to move away from politically. Worse, Carlson, the WSJ and others in the media then simultaneously devolve the meaning of the “hawkish on China” stance—desired by members of both political parties—into a war posture position, one that may have little connection to successfully meeting the pacing challenges of China in reality.  

Civilian elected officials should publicly disagree with an administration's position and decisions – public debate is a mechanism for democratic accountability. The military, however, has no place weighing in on civilian debates over the administration’s framing of China and the means and ways it uses to meet this strategic challenge. 

Exacerbating the problem is a media ecosystem, primarily but not exclusively on the right, looking for military sources to support their own biases and criticisms. This demand also ensures that military personnel who break these norms to dissent, however rare, know that they will have a receptive audience.

The United States can both manage and meet the “pacing challenge” of China through diplomatic measures with political and economic means while simultaneously addressing questions of readiness for potential conflict. However, by taking advantage of the implicit trust placed in his institution to publicly undermine civilian leadership, Minihan inappropriately leverages his credibility and pushes the US to take the posture that war is inevitable.

Gunnar Wainwright (MPA ‘24) concentrates in International Security Policy with a specialization in Technology Media and Communications. Prior to SIPA, Gunnar was a program coordinator for Sesame Workshop's Ahlan Simsim program, a humanitarian intervention focused on early childhood development. His areas of interest are technology, national security and defense strategy.

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