Beijing’s Cambodia Push: Soft Power, Hard Interests
Chinese and Cambodian flags. (Photo/Li Qian/CGTN)
By Tanya Reddy Sattineni
In 2025, the Trump administration unexpectedly dismantled USAID, the world's largest foreign aid agency, triggering far-reaching humanitarian, health, and economic repercussions. Secretary Rubio announced in a tweet that “after a 6 week review we are officially cancelling 83% of the programs at USAID.”
As a result, over a million people in Ethiopia lost access to food assistance, and the approximately 5,000 healthcare workers serving them had their contracts abruptly terminated. In the DRC, a programme treating tens of thousands of malnourished children was stopped, and in Mali, a $25 million literacy and vocational programme teaching 20,000 young Malians was shut down.
These cuts carry significant long-term implications for the US. The US has long used aid programmes to build influence and alliances abroad. Leaving large aid vacuums frees space for other powers to influence critical regions. Cutting programs in conflict-affected regions, like refugee camps, poses a security risk as this breeds resentment and leads to increased recruitment for extremist groups. Defunding Africa’s health systems and disease control programs can lead to higher mortality and regional instability, as pathogens do not respect borders. Altogether, the US stands to lose up to $23 billion from US exports alone.
In Cambodia, a country historically reliant on Western aid, this void is particularly acute. In February 2025, USAID terminated contracts combating health challenges, improving education, protecting children’s rights, and preventing human trafficking. China moved with unusual speed and diplomatic efficiency to fill that gap.
Chinese aid agencies quickly launched programs in Cambodia that mirrored suspended USAID programs. For example, USAID terminated programs on child literacy and early childhood nutrition, together worth about $40 million. A week later, China announced its commitment to fund similar projects focused on “inclusive education for vulnerable children” by providing school supplies and improving outcomes for “vulnerable” newborns and children with disabilities. Similarly, China recently renewed the Landmine Elimination Agency and the malaria eradication project, both initiatives which had been funded by USAID. In reshaping Cambodia’s aid landscape, China is gaining influence over the West in Southeast Asia.
While China’s focus on aid is new, its international investment is not. Between 2013 and 2022, China invested $679 billion on infrastructure projects in almost 150 countries, compared to the United States’s $76 billion. In Cambodia, Chinese investment targeted infrastructure, construction and energy sectors. Over the 2010s, China funded the Techo International Airport (2018), the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway (2019) and the Lower Sesan 2 Hydropower Plant (2013). China’s earlier investment pattern in capital-intensive infrastructure draws a sharp contrast with its current socio-humanitarian investments.
China’s recent pivot to aid in Cambodia fortifies its influence in a strategic region. Cambodia’s partnership in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is crucial for Chinese regional diplomacy, specifically to Thailand, Vietnam and Laos, as it creates a land-sea corridor that strengthens China’s supply chain connectivity across the Greater Mekong Subregion.
Cambodia’s geopolitical position enables China to bypass key maritime chokepoints and instead trade via overland routes. As a key ASEAN member, Cambodia also helps China to avoid accountability for its “gray zone” tactics in the South China Sea.
Beyond BRI considerations, Cambodia's location provides key military advantages to China. The country’s southern coast gives China access to the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea, and it is home to China's first military outpost in Southeast Asia - the Ream Naval Base. This provides China with an alternative access point to the contested sea from the west, bypassing chokepoints near the Philippines.
Policy experts warn that China’s growing aid to Cambodia may create financial dependence and undermine national autonomy. For example, past Chinese investments in Djibouti led to a sharp escalation in external debt causing debt obligations to triple from $54 million to $184 million.
Given its history of Western aid dependence, the speed of China’s delivery of support, and its geopolitical importance, Cambodia provides a unique opportunity to observe China’s new aid strategy. The full impact of China’s humanitarian assistance remains uncertain, but Cambodia is likely a harbinger for what lies ahead.